Message from Monmouth University-Gannett Poll: A GOTV Election

Although yesterday’s Monmouth University/Gannett Poll showed Chris Christie’s lead over Jon Corzine among likely voters being reduced from fourteen to eight percentage points, there was good news in the poll for the Republican challenger as well.  In spite of an onslaught from Jon Corzine of negative ad hominem television commercials, Christie’s negative personal approval ratings did not increase over the past month.  Furthermore, the reduction in his lead among likely voters was no surprise to the Christie campaign – it was simply the result of the expected return to the Corzine column of Democrat base voters.

There was, however, one very ominous sign in the poll for the Christie campaign.  While Christie leads Corzine among likely voters,  Corzine actually now leads Christie among registered voters by one percent.  This is a significant change from the six point lead the Republican challenger enjoyed among registered voters in July and the four point lead he held in August.

It will be the central goal of the Corzine campaign, through Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) efforts, to get to the polls on Election Day the maximum number of these lukewarm Corzine supporters who presently fall under the classification of “registered but not likely” voters.  It is indeed in the area of GOTV that the Corzine campaign has a major advantage over the Christie campaign, due to the continued state Democratic Party organizational and financial advantages.

This Democratic advantage over the Republicans in the area of GOTV is of absolutely critical significance in this campaign.  As Patrick Murray, Director of the Monmouth University Polling Institute noted in the poll press release, “While we acknowledge that most of these ‘unlikely’ voters will never cast a ballot in this race, if the Corzine team can bump up turnout on Election Day by just a few percentage points, their chances of victory greatly increase…The bottom line is that turnout always matters.  It just may matter more in this election than usual.”

The good news for Corzine is that as we approach Election Day, the results in the “likely” voters survey will normally increasingly approximate that of the “registered” voters survey.  To understand this, one must know the nature of the “screening” questions the Monmouth/Gannett poll uses to separate “likely” from “registered but unlikely” voters.

There are basically five Monmouth/Gannett screening questions asked of the person polled: 1) his or her registration status; 2) his or her interest level in the election; 3) how he or she rates his or her likelihood of voting in the election; 4) his or her awareness of the location of their voting place; 5) his or her voting frequency – always, nearly always, part of the time, or seldom.

As Election Day draws near, the “registered but unlikely” voter will hear or read much more news about the election campaign.  This will certainly increase the "registered but unlikely” voter’s interest in the election (Screening Question 2) and likewise raise the likelihood of him or her voting in the election (Screening Question 3).  Thus, many previously classified “registered but unlikely” voters will move into the “likely” voter classification.  As one can reasonably infer from the most recent Monmouth/Gannett poll, these newly classified “likely” voters will overwhelmingly vote for Corzine.

GOTV efforts are critical to ensuring the Election Day turnout of these newly classified “likely” voters, as well as the “base” voters of the candidate.  It is axiomatic that the three components of a campaign are money, message, and organization.  GOTV is primarily dependent on the organizational and money success of a campaign, although message certainly plays an important role.

I have been highly critical of the “message” strategy of the Christie campaign – in fact, I have been critical at various times of the message strategies of the Corzine and Daggett campaigns as well.  In terms of the New Jersey Democrat State Party organizational advantage, however, this is not due to any fault on the part of Chris Christie, Republican State Committee Chair Jay Webber, or the Christie campaign “brain trust”.  Instead, it is a result of the deterioration of the GOP statewide infrastructure and county organizations that has been ongoing since the Democrats took over the Governorship in January, 2002.

A successful GOTV program relies on coordination of the campaign and the State Party Committee with strong county organizations that provide volunteer workers and insight into local turnout factors.  Money is critical for expenses of Election Day workers, print materials, and phone banks.

In 1997, the then New Jersey Republican State Committee Chairman Chuck Haytaian and his Executive Director, Rocco Iossa coordinated a highly successful statewide GOTV effort that was the critical factor in the hairsbreadth Governor’s race victory of Christie Whitman over Jim McGreevey.  Haytaian was an outstanding state chair who was also a highly successful fundraiser.

Twelve years later, the New Jersey Republican State Committee is a shell of what it was in 1997.  While there remain a few strong county GOP organizations, such as in the Northwest Quadrant and Ocean County under George Gilmore’s leadership, most of the others have declined significantly in terms of effectiveness.

Republican State Committee fundraising is also problematic, due to two factors beyond the control of Chris Christie and Jay Webber: 1) The economy, which has severely impacted traditional Republican fundraising sources, such as Wall Street investment bankers and traders and Main Street entrepreneurs; and 2) The pay-to-play reforms, which prohibit state agencies from awarding contracts worth more than $17,500 to companies that have donated more than $300 to a gubernatorial campaign or any state or county political party within 18 months.

The pay-to-play regulation factor definitely discourages contributions from major Republican law firm partners.  In this regard, the New Jersey Republican Party, which vigorously sought the enactment of pay-to-play reforms a few years back, is being hoisted by its own petard.

By contrast, the Corzine campaign has two significant GOTV advantages: 1) Organized labor, which provides a huge source of Election Day volunteers; and 2) the Corzine checkbook, which compensates for diminished Democrat campaign contributions due to the economy and pay-to-play reforms.

The ultimate Democrat GOTV asset, however, will be President Barack Obama, who remains highly popular among Democrat base voters, most significantly African-Americans and Hispanics.  While the healthcare issue has resulted in Obama’s job approval numbers declining significantly among Independent voters, the White House and the Corzine political “brain trust” will doubtless target Obama’s efforts in New Jersey to urban areas, where turnout is essential to Corzine’s statewide success.

Will Chris Christie and Jay Webber be able to overcome the Democrat GOTV advantage on Election Day?   The key for Christie is the ability of his message to attract his voters to the polls, thereby trumping the Corzine money and organizational advantages.  That is why I think the Christie message strategy of attempting to “run out the clock” and avoiding specific proposals on key issues, most notably property tax, is a serious and possibly fatal error.  A pallid message harping on Corzine’s failures will not be enough to win this election.

In any event, the present virtual tie among registered voters may well resemble the final outcome of Governor’s Race 2009.  My advice to election observers is:  Get ready for a cliffhanger, and don’t bet on the outcome of this election.  As for both Republican and Democrat attorneys, be prepared to work in a recount effort.

Alan J. Steinberg served as Regional Administrator of Region 2 EPA during the administration of former President George W. Bush. Region 2 EPA consists of the states of New York and New Jersey, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and seven federally recognized Indian nations.